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Abstract—Reverse pricing has been recognized as an effective
tool to handle demand uncertainty in the travel industry (e.g.,
airlines and hotels). To investigate its viability for communication
networks, we study the practical limitations of (operator-driven)
time-dependent pricing that has been recently introduced, taking
into account demand uncertainty. Compared to (operator-driven)
time-dependent pricing, we show that the proposed pricing
scheme can achieve “triple-win” solutions: an increase in the
total average revenue of the operator; higher average resource
utilization efficiency; and an increment in the total average payoff
of the users. Our findings provide a new outlook on resource
allocation, and design guidelines for adopting the reverse pricing
scheme.
Index Terms—Reverse pricing, communication networks, rev-
enue management, resource allocation, demand uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a tool for balancing capacity and demand, pricing has
played a decisive role in the design and management of mod-
ern communication networks [1]. In order to achieve various
network objectives (i.e., “optimization-oriented” for maximum
system performance or “economics-oriented” pricing for max-
imum revenue), a great deal of scholarly work has explored
the proper design of pricing schemes [2]–[6]. However, a
considerable mismatch between capacity and demand has been
observed in reality [7]. One potential reason for such mismatch
is that the uncertainty of network demand is largely ignored
in the literature. For example, the network demand is often
unknown to an operator in priori. Since the operator has to
face or predict the demand uncertainty, it inevitably results
in under-utilization of capacity. In this work, we address
this challenging issue, from a new economics-oriented pricing
framework.
With the ever-increasing desire for more data volume, net-
work operators have widely adopted the usage-based pricing
scheme in both wireline and wireless communication networks
[8], [9]. However, much of such pricing scheme is based on
the monthly network demand, leading to high peak-to-average
ratios of the network demand. For example, the network de-
mand in peak hours can be ten times more than that in off-peak
hours [10]. As a remedy to this inefficiency, time-dependent
usage-based pricing (TDP) was introduced to reduce the peak-
to-average ratios of the network demand, taking into the actual
network demand [11]. In [11], the authors showed that 24%
of traffic can be redistributed over a day, through incentivizing
users to shift their usage to off-peak hours with lower prices.
Nevertheless, we argue that resorting to (operator-driven) TDP
still poses the problem of matching current network capacity
with the network demand, because TDP still has to face or
predict the demand uncertainty, rather than embracing it.
As a complement to (operator-driven) TDP1, in this paper,
we propose reverse pricing to effectively handle unexpected
demand fluctuations. Exemplified by Priceline.com [12], re-
verse pricing (also known as “name-your-own-price”) is a
market mechanism under which the network operator decides
a resource recommendation rule and a hidden bid-acceptance
threshold a priori, while each user submits a bid (unit price)
that he is willing to pay for a given amount of resources. If
the bid exceeds the unknown threshold price, it is accepted.
The user then pays his bid and uses the specified resources.
Intuitively, the superiority of reverse pricing is its natural
ability to deal with the demand uncertainty over time. How-
ever, the challenge here is that such user participation in the
pricing process may decrease the network operator’s revenue,
due to the negative cannibalization effect. Then, a natural
question is: How to design reverse pricing in conjunction
with forward pricing subject to both demand uncertainty and
capacity constraint, with the goal of boosting the network
operator’s expected revenue?
This paper endeavors to design such reverse pricing on
top of forward pricing to answer the above question with
stylized communication network models. To this end, we first
model the interaction between a single network operator and
the users as a four-stage Stackelberg game, when employing
reverse pricing along with forward pricing. To investigate
its economic viability, we propose the proportional residual
resource recommendation rule in which a user is allocated the
available remaining resources in proportion to his payment
via forward pricing, and examine the hidden bid-acceptance
threshold conditions under which it is more profitable to adopt
reverse pricing. We analyze the case of forward pricing only,
as a baseline to evaluate the effects of utilizing the reverse
pricing scheme. We show that our reverse pricing can achieve
“triple-win” solutions: an increase in the average total revenue
of the operator; higher average resource utilization efficiency;
and an increment in the total average payoff of the users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes the system model. Section III introduces the reverse
1For the rest of paper, we will use the term ‘forward pricing’ to refer
(operator-driven) TDP.
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2Fig. 1. Timing of the game.
pricing mechanism and investigates its economic viability.
Section IV examines the forward pricing scheme only, as a
baseline to evaluate the impact of the proposed reverse pricing
scheme on the average total revenue of the operator’s revenue,
the users’ payoffs, and the resource utilization efficiency.
Section V gives numerical results to validate the proposed
studies, followed by concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
To abstract the interaction between a single network oper-
ator and users, and to introduce our reverse pricing scheme
smoothly, without loss of generality, we consider a specific
system model hereafter. This, however, does not mean that
our scheme is only applicable to such specific model. Now let
us consider a communication network with a total amount of
available resource Q (e.g., bandwidth, data rate, data amount,
etc). A single network operator allocates this resource to a set
I , {1, · · · , I} of users. We assume that the users have time-
varying demand preferences for resources. These preferences
are associated with their demand patterns over time. In this
regard, we consider a time-slotted system where the resource
scheduling horizon is divided into a set H , {1, · · · , H} of
time slots. Note that this time slot can be based on time-
varying demand patterns: peak network demand time slots,
normal network demand time slots, and off-peak network
demand time slots.
Each user i ∈ I chooses a finite amount of resources based
on his own time-varying demand preferences and the service
prices over time. Specifically, user i aims to maximize his
own payoff, which is the difference between the utility of
the allocated resource and the payment to the operator. Let
p ,
[
ph
]
h∈H denote the (operator-driven) price vector per
unit resource over the resource scheduling horizon H. We
assume p is known to the users before the resource scheduling
horizon (i.e., ex-ante price), and remains constant at the end
of the current scheduling horizon. Without loss of generality,
the payoff function for user i at time slot h can be defined as
ui(θ
h
i , s
h
i , p
h) = θhi ln(1 + s
h
i )− phshi , (1)
where shi is the allocated resource to user i, and θ
h
i is the
time-varying willingness to pay of user i per unit resource.
As stated in [13], [14], the logarithmic utility function in (1)
has been widely used to model the proportionally fair resource
allocation in communication networks.
We consider two types of pricing schemes:
1) Forward pricing only: The operator publishes the ex-
ante unit price vector p over the resource scheduling
horizon H. The purpose of the operator is to maximize
its expected revenue based on demand predictions. It
implies that the operator has to encounter some level of
demand uncertainty. This residual uncertainty stemming
from users’ actual resource consumption may waste some
available resources.
2) Reverse pricing on top of forward pricing: As a com-
plement to forward pricing, the operator partially relin-
quishes its pricing control to the users. However, we
assume that each user i needs to report the amount of
resources shi based on p
h, ahead of time slot h. From
this contract, the operator calculates the residual resources
Q−∑i∈I shi , and suggests to allocate more resources to
user i in proportional to shi , i.e., x
h
i = s
h
i +
shi∑
j∈I s
h
j
(Q−∑
j∈I s
h
j ). Under this proportional residual resource rec-
ommendation rule, the operator publicly specifies the
minimum participation unit price phmin below which x
h
i is
not sold before time slot h, and generates the hidden bid-
acceptance threshold τh (price) with a known distribution
on the interval [phmin, p
h), Specifically, τh is unknown
to the users, but the distribution is common knowledge
among the users. Then, user i can name his own unit
price bhi at will for x
h
i and receives x
h
i if b
h
i exceeds τ
h
at each time slot h (If not, user i receives shi with the
unit price ph).
Fig. 1 shows the timing of the game that characterizes the
interaction between the operator and users. In Stage I, the
operator announces the unit price vector to the users over
the resource scheduling horizon, estimating the potential total
demand from users. Due to the limited resource available,
the operator should design the forward pricing scheme to
guarantee that the aggregate user demand is no larger than
what it can provide. In Stage II, each user acts as a price
taker and chooses the amount of resources over time according
to the published unit price vector. When the operator employs
forward pricing only, the game ends. When the operator adopts
3reverse pricing on top of forward pricing, on the other hand,
each user is required to report his resource usage via forward
pricing, before the beginning of each time slot. In Stage III, the
operator calculates the total demand from the users via forward
pricing, sets a resource recommendation rule, and generates a
hidden bid-acceptance threshold with a minimum participation
unit price via reverse pricing. In Stage IV, each user names
his own unit price for the given amount of resources, and
the resource is allocated to him immediately and accordingly
depending on whether or not his submitted bid exceeds the
operator’s hidden bid-acceptance threshold. We solve these
two different games by using backward induction from Stage
IV to Stage I, and discuss one by one in the following sections.
III. REVERSE PRICING ON TOP OF FORWARD PRICING
We first consider that the operator adopts the reverse pricing
scheme on top of the forward pricing scheme. Given the
(operator-driven) unit price vector and the corresponding total
demand of the users over the resource scheduling horizon,
we investigate the users’ participation decisions and corre-
sponding bidding strategies, as well as the operator’s resource
recommendation rule and hidden bid-acceptance threshold
with a known distribution. We start with the users’s cases,
with the hope to shed light on the feasibility of utilizing the
reverse pricing scheme.
A. Users’ Participation Decisions and Subsequent Bidding
Strategies in Stage IV
Without loss of generality, we assume that xi ,[
xhi
]
h∈H,i∈I denote the user i’s resource vector declared by
the operator in Stage III. For analytical tractability, we assume
that the operator generates the hidden bid-acceptance threshold
τh that is uniformly distributed on the interval [phmin, p
h]. We
remark that 0 ≤ phmin < ph is the minimum participation unit
price, where each user should submit his bid at least phmin at
time slot h via reverse pricing.
Given xhi and p
h
min at time slot h, user i decides whether
to participate in the pricing process, i.e.,
θhi ln(1+x
h
i )−phminxhi ≥θhi ln(1+shi )−phshi ,∀i∈I, ∀h∈H, (2)
where shi is the user i’s reported resource usage in Stage II,
based on the announced price per unit resource ph in Stage I.
For inducing user i to take part in the pricing process, phmin
must satisfy the constraint (2), i.e.,
phmin ≤
θhi ln
(
(1 + xhi )/(1 + s
h
i )
)
+ phshi
xhi
. (3)
Otherwise, user i has no incentive to name his own unit
price bhi (i.e., b
h
i = 0). Based on it, we define I+(phmin) ={
i ∈ I : phmin ≤
θhi ln((1+x
h
i )/(1+s
h
i ))+p
hshi
xhi
}
, i.e., the set of
users that would name strictly positive prices at time slot h in
Stage IV.
Since each user i ∈ I+(phmin) is uncertain to the hidden
bid-acceptance threshold τh, each user i names his own price
bhi to maximize the following expected payoff:
P1 : max
phmin≤bhi ≤ph
ui(θ
h
i , x
h
i , b
h
i )P(b
h
i ≥ τh) +
ui(θ
h
i , s
h
i , p
h)P(bhi < τ
h),∀i ∈ I+(phmin), ∀h ∈ H, (4)
Proposition 1: For each user i ∈ I, the optimal solution for
Problem P1 at each time slot h ∈ H is given by
bh
∗
i =

1
2xhi
[
θhi ln
(
1+xhi
1+shi
)
+shi p
h+xhi p
h
min
]
, ∀i∈I+(phmin),
0, ∀i∈I\I+(phmin).
(5)
Proof: To verify that Problem P1 is a convex optimization
with respect to bhi , let us rewrite this problem as follows:
max
phmin≤bhi ≤ph
(
θhi ln(1 + x
h
i )− bhi xhi
) bhi − phmin
ph − phmin
+
(
θhi ln(1+s
h
i )−phi shi
) ph−bhi
ph−phmin
, ∀i∈I+(phmin), ∀h∈H. (6)
Apparently, the constraint is a convex set. Thus, it suffices
to examine that the second order derivative is less than 0. Let
fi(b
h
i ) denote the user i’s objective function in (4). Then we
have
∂2fi
∂bh
2
i
=
2xhi
ph− phmin
< 0, (7)
which proves that Problem P1 is a convex optimization with
respect to bhi . Exploiting the first order necessary condition
yields
bh
∗
i =
1
2xhi
θhi ln
(
1+xhi
1+ shi
)
+ shi p
h+xhi p
h
min
 , (8)
which completes the proof.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal bidding strategies of
the users in Stage IV. Since the users maximize their expected
payoff against the probability of being accepted via reverse
pricing, they tend to name their own unit prices below the unit
price that the operator sets (i.e., bh
∗
i = (p
h
min + p
h)/2 < ph
when xhi = s
h
i ). It hints on how to design the reverse pricing
mechanism to extract more revenue from the users.
B. Operator’s Resource Recommendation Rule and Hidden
Bid-Acceptance Threshold in Stage III
We now consider how to utilize the reverse pricing scheme
along with the forward pricing scheme. To this end, we are
interested in examining the following two issues:
1) How to design a resource recommendation rule based on
the total demand from the users in Stage II, subject to
the total limited resource?
2) How to commit to a minimum markup strategy for
generating the hidden bid-acceptance threshold with the
goal of boosting the operator’s expected revenue?
To address these issues one by one, we first investigate the
resource recommendation rule in the reverse pricing scheme.
Let Qr ,
[(
Q−∑i∈I shi )+]
h∈H
denote the residual re-
source available over the resource scheduling horizon H,
where (·)+ denotes max{·, 0}. In the special case where no
4resource is left to the operator at time slot h (i.e., Qhr = 0),
the operator allocates the same amount of resources submitted
by the users in Stage II (i.e., xhi = s
h
i ).
When Qhr > 0, on the other hand, the operator decides
the resource recommendation rule to satisfy the following
conditions:
Q ≥
∑
i∈I
xhi ≥
∑
i∈I
shi , ∀h ∈ H (9)
where the first inequality in (9) corresponds to the maximum
available resource constraint that the operator can provide
via reverse pricing, and the second inequality in (9) comes
from the operator’s revenue maximization standpoint through
the disposal of residual available resources, as noted in the
previous subsection. In this case, intuitively, the operator
seeks to clear the market, i.e., Q =
∑
i∈I x
h
i for revenue
maximization.
Capturing the idea that more resources reported from the
users in Stage II implicitly mean higher willingness to pay
of them, in this work, we propose the proportional residual
resource recommendation rule. To be more specific, the op-
erator simply suggests to allocate the remaining amount of
resources to each user i in proportion to his reported amount
of resources shi in Stage II (i.e., x
h∗
i = s
h
i +
shi∑
j∈I s
h
j
Qhr ).
Next we explain how the operator determines a hidden
bid-acceptance threshold τh given the proportional residual
resource recommendation rule. To this end, the operator should
examine the conditions under which it is more profitable
to employ the reverse pricing scheme. The answer to these
conditions is intertwined with the minimum participation unit
price phmin.
Given that user i reports his resource consumption shi via
forward pricing in Stage II, the operator tries to set phmin, i.e.,
phminx
h∗
i ≥ phshi , ∀i ∈ I, ∀h ∈ H, (10)
where the constraint (10) indicates that the operator avoids
the revenue loss via reverse pricing, by setting phmin to earn
at least the revenue via forward pricing. We then have the
following results as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Assume that an operator adopts a proportional
residual resource recommendation rule based on the reported
aggregate user demand in Stage II. The minimum participation
unit price that the operator sets should satisfy the following
condition
ph > phmin ≥
ph
∑
i∈I s
h
i
Q
, ∀h ∈ H. (11)
Proof: The proportional residual resource recommenda-
tion rule leads to Q =
∑
i∈I x
h∗
i . Summing over all i under
the constraint (10) completes the proof.
Lemma 1 shows the viability of utilizing the reverse pricing
scheme on top of the forward pricing scheme. By exploiting
the revealed total user demand in Stage II, the operator can
boost its revenue.
For revenue maximization, however, the operator should
further investigate its expected revenue under different values
of phmin. When p
h
min is small, in general, the users tend to bid
with lower prices (see the last term in Eq. (5)). This implies
that more potentially profitable trades are expected to occur,
at the cost of the higher decrease in its revenue per user via
reverse pricing. When phmin is large, on the other hand, the
reverse is generally true. Thus, the operator should set phmin
as a strategic variable, taking this trade-off into account. A
numerical example of this will be discussed in Sec. V.
IV. BENCHMARK SCENARIO: FORWARD PRICING ONLY
In the previous section, we have investigated the viability of
introducing the reverse pricing scheme on top of the forward
pricing scheme. In this section, we consider the case of the
forward pricing scheme only. This study serves as a baseline
to evaluate the impact and significance of the reverse pricing
scheme on the average operator’s revenue, the average total
user payoff, and the average resource utilization efficiency. By
backward induction again, we start from Stage II where each
user acts as a price taker and adjusts his amount of resource
over time.
A. Users’ Desired Resources in Stage II
As described in Sec. II, if the operator announces a unit
price ph at each time slot h ∈ H in Stage I, each user i ∈ I
solves the following payoff maximization problem:
P2 : max
shi
ui(θ
h
i , s
h
i , p
h) = θhi ln(1 + s
h
i )− phshi , (12)
which leads to
sh
∗
i =
(
θhi
ph
− 1
)+
. (13)
In the following analysis, throughout the paper, we only
focus on a special case of Problem P2 by assuming that all
the users are always admitted (i.e., sh
∗
i > 0,∀i ∈ I,∀h ∈ H)2.
B. Operator’s Forward Pricing in Stage I
In Stage I, the operator tries to maximize its expected
revenue over the resource scheduling horizon based on demand
predictions. For the operator experiencing a variety of time-
varying demand patterns, the assumption of the complete
information of the network demand a priori is not valid in
general. To limit the dimension of this issue, we assume
that the operator knows the payoff function of each user i
in (4), but θhi is a random variable with a finite mean with
a bounded magnitude at each time slot h. For the ease of
exposition, the time-varying willingness to pay for user i can
be expressed as θhi = θ˜
h
i + δ
h
i , where θ˜
h
i is a finite mean and
δhi is a random variable that indicates a time variance in user
i’s willingness to pay. We further assume that δhi is a zero-
mean random variable with a bounded magnitude known to
the operator. Mathematically, E
(
δhi
)
= 0 and |δhi | ≤ hi , with
hi > 0 denoting the maximum magnitude of user i’s demand
uncertainty, ∀i ∈ I,∀h ∈ H. Without loss of generality, we
assume that θ˜h1 − h1 ≥ θ˜h2 − h2 ≥ · · · ≥ θ˜hI − hI at each time
slot h.
Under the above assumption, the operator seeks to announce
the optimal price vector p to maximize its expected revenue
2This assumption does not change the main insights obtained in this paper.
5over the resource scheduling horizon H, subject to the limited
total resource Q. This is obtained by solving the following
optimization problem:
P3 : max
p≥0
∑
h∈H
∑
i∈I
Eθhi
(
θhi − ph
)
, (14)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
(
θhi
ph
− 1
)
≤ Q, ∀h ∈ H. (15)
Note that we do not take the expectation of the resource
constraint in (15) with respect to θhi , to always guarantee that
the aggregate user demand in Stage II is no larger than what
the operator can provide.
For satisfying the resource constraint in (15), the operator
should set the ex-ante price ph, i.e.,
∑
i∈I
(
θhi
ph
− 1
)
(a)
≤
∑
i∈I
(
θ˜hi + 
h
i
ph
− 1
)
≤ Q, ∀h ∈ H, (16)
where (a) follows from the maximum value of θhi . Since the
objective function in (14) is a decreasing function of ph at
each time slot h, we can reformulate Problem P3 as follows:
P4 : min
p≥0
∑
h∈H
∑
i∈I
ph, (17)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
(
θ˜hi + 
h
i
ph
− 1
)
≤ Q, ∀h ∈ H. (18)
Proposition 2: Given Q >
∑
i∈I θ˜
h
i +
h
i
θ˜hI−hI
− I , the optimal
solution to Problem P4 is given by
ph
∗
=
∑
i∈I θ˜
h
i + 
h
i
Q+ I
, ∀h ∈ H. (19)
Proof: The objective function in (17) is an increasing
function of ph at time slot h. On the other hand, the left hand
side of the resource constraint in (18) is decreasing in ph.
Thus the optimal solution can be obtained when the equality
in (18) holds. Since all the users are always admitted, the
optimal solution (19) in should be less than θ˜hI − hI , which
completes the proof.
Proposition 2 reveals the practical limitation, from the
operator’s revenue maximization perspective. As the level of
demand uncertainty hi is higher, the operator has to charge a
higher price ph
∗
i to the users to satisfy the resource constraint
in (18). It may lead to large demand fluctuations at the operator
in accordance with users’ actual resource consumption.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We provide numerical examples to study several key prop-
erties of reverse pricing on top of forward pricing. Consider
a 100-user in the network where the total amount of available
resource is chosen as Q = 1000. The resource scheduling
horizon is set as H = {1, 2, · · · , 10}. The time-varying
willingness to pay of user i follows the uniform distribution
on [1, 2h] at each time slot h. The minimum participation unit
price is fixed as phmin =
ph
∑
i∈I s
h
i
Q unless specified otherwise.
Each graph represents an average over 1000 independent
realizations at each time slot h.
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Fig. 2. Reverse pricing on top of forward pricing vs. forward pricing only.
Fig. 2(a) shows how the average network demand changes
over the resource scheduling horizon. With forward pricing
only, there is a still large difference between the maximum
available resource and the average network demand. In this
simulation, as each time slot passes over the resource schedul-
ing horizon, such difference becomes more distinct due to
the higher level of demand uncertainty. With reverse pricing
on top of forward pricing, on the other hand, it is more
6effectively handled. From this, it is observed from Fig. 2(b)
that our proposed pricing scheme always outperforms the
forward pricing scheme only, in terms of the average total
user payoff. Even if each user reports his actual resource
usage via forward pricing, the incentive to name his own price
brings benefits to him. Fig. 2(c) shows that the operator can
extract more revenue with reverse pricing in conjunction with
forward pricing. Rather than facing the demand uncertainty,
this result implies that the operator should re-examine the idea
of involving the users in pricing decisions.
We then examine the effects of the minimum participation
unit price level p5min/p
5∗ at a particular time slot (i.e., time slot
5). Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) show that the average network demand
and the average total user payoff are both non-increasing
over p5min/p
5∗ . This is due to the fact that the users are
induced to submit higher bids as p5min/p
5∗ increases. Fig.
3(c) shows the average operator’s revenue as a function of
p5min/p
5∗ . When p5min/p
5∗ is low (i.e., p5min/p
5∗ ≤ 0.2), the
operator can obtain more average revenue via forward pricing
only (i.e., negative cannibalization effect). When p5min/p
5∗ is
intermediate (i.e., 0.2 < p5min/p
5∗ < 0.9), the operator can
achieve more average revenue via reverse pricing on top of
forward pricing (i.e., positive cannibalization effect). With the
goal of maximizing its average revenue, p5min/p
5∗ is chosen
as 0.7, achieving a large revenue gain (e.g., 14%) compared
to forward pricing only. When 0.9 ≤ p5min/p5
∗ ≤ 1, no users
name their own prices, degenerating the forward pricing only
case.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studies resource allocation mechanisms with
reverse pricing for communication networks. As a complement
to forward pricing, we design the reverse pricing mechanism
to effectively handle unexpected demand fluctuations. We
show that the proposed pricing scheme can obtain “triple-
win” solutions: an increase in the average total revenue of the
operator; higher average resource utilization efficiency; and an
increment in the total average payoff of the users. In communi-
cation networks, pricing has been used for congestion-control,
where the problem is a utility maximization while satisfying
capacity constraints. This problem has been a classical issue
since the work of Kelly [1]. Therefore, we believe our reverse
pricing will change the structure of the traditional congestion-
control that are based on price-signaling depending on the
congestion levels (i.e., Lagrangian multipliers). This will be
an interesting issue where our current research is heading.
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Fig. 3. Impact of the minimum participation unit price level (p5min/p
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the average network demand, the average total user payoff, and the average
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